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When Can Decision Makers Learn from Financial
Market Prices?
I analyze a general setting where a policymaker needs information that fi-
nancial market traders have in order to implement optimal policy, and prices
can potentially reveal this information. Policy decisions, in turn, affect asset
values. I derive a condition for the existence of fully revealing equilibria in
competitive financial markets, which identifies all situations where learning
from prices for policy purposes works. I discuss the possibility of using mar-
ket information for banking supervision and central banking, and the general
problem of asset design. I also demonstrate that some corporate prediction
markets are ill-designed, and show how to fix it.
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Economists have long recognized that markets can ag-
gregate and reveal diverse information among market participants via market prices
(e.g., Hayek 1945). More recently, scholars and practitioners have called for using
market information to improve real decisions and policymaking. There are many ar-
eas where market information might help. For example, a central bank (CB) may use
asset prices to infer information about inflation expectations or future demand shocks,
and adapt policy in response (Bernanke and Woodford 1997). A regulator may learn
about the financial health of a bank from bond prices, and use this information for
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regulatory purposes (e.g., contingent capital with market trigger, Sundaresan and
Wang 2015). Or a company could use internal prediction markets—where asset val-
ues depend on the launch date of a new product—to predict whether deadlines can be
met, and react if forecasts indicate major delays (e.g., Cowgill and Zitzewitz 2015).
In all of these examples, one or several agents—which I shall call policymakers—
react to the information contained in asset prices, and the reaction in turn affects asset
values. However, this simultaneous feedback from prices to asset values and from as-
set values to prices presents problems both in theoretical and practical terms. In prac-
tical terms, the policy reaction may punish traders, which diminishes their incentives
to reveal information, thus making market prices less informative and reducing their
usefulness for policymakers. A theoretical problem is that such policymaker–trader
interactions may not have an equilibrium. The main goal of this paper is to iden-
tify if and when it is possible for markets to inform policymakers if traders correctly
anticipate the policymaker reaction.1
To address this question, I develop a general yet simple model of trader and pol-
icymaker interaction in competitive financial markets, and derive a necessary and
sufficient condition where traders reveal their information by trading, and policy-
makers use this information for policy purposes in equilibrium. Thus, the condition
identifies all situations where we can expect financial markets to work as policymaker
tools without compromising the informativeness of prices, and all situations where
we cannot. In the setting considered here, full revelation has positive welfare conse-
quences and leads to a Pareto-optimal outcome, as it allows the policymaker to adopt
the optimal policy.
Informally, the condition specifies whether the pricing problem is a self-defeating
prophecy. The condition is simple and requires invertibility of the expected asset value
given the optimal policy reaction to trader information in a sufficient statistic of trader
information. If the condition is not fulfilled, then traders anticipate that informative
prices would trigger a policymaker reaction that leads to trader losses, thus revelation
of trader information is not incentive compatible.2
To illustrate the self-defeating prophecy problem, consider the “deadline securi-
ties” in corporate predictionmarkets, which are designed to forecast whether a project
will be completed on time (e.g., Cowgill and Zitzewitz 2015). In the applications, I
show these provide improper incentives for traders to share information about the
project if management reacts to these forecasts. In such a market, employees can
buy/sell an asset that pays off 1 if and only if the deadline of a certain project is
missed, and 0 otherwise. Buying the asset is equivalent to betting on the deadline
being missed. Thus, a high price of the asset indicates that many employees think the
1. Clearly, an unanticipated policymaker intervention does not diminish the incentives to trade on
information. This paper instead focuses on the possibility of policymakers systematically using the infor-
mation revealed by market prices.
2. Technically, as this is a competitive model, traders are not willing to clear the market for any fully
revealing price function.
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deadline will be missed, and the efficient market hypothesis suggests that the prices
should be good forecasts of whether the deadline will be missed.
But now suppose management assigns additional resources if the price is high in
order to prevent the deadline from being missed. Employees working on the project
know whether the deadline is realistic, and can reveal that information by buy-
ing/selling the asset. Yet if an employee truthfully reveals that the deadline will be
missed—by buying the asset and driving up the price—then management learns the
deadline is not realistic and intervenes, thereby making the deadline realistic. Thus,
traders who bet on the deadline being missed are punished: they bought the asset at
a high price, but due to the reaction its value will be 0. In other words, traders fore-
cast an asset value of 1 (deadline missed), but management reacts to this forecast and
falsifies it by assigning more resources to the project. Thus, the pricing problem is a
self-defeating prophecy.
Similarly, the necessary and sufficient condition can be used in any other con-
text to check whether existing markets or assets promote information revelation by
traders. And perhaps more importantly, if an existing setting features a self-defeating
prophecy, the condition can be used to design different kinds of assets. Regarding the
project deadline prediction markets, I show that a different asset design can fix the
problem and restore the trader incentives for information revelation.
Using the model, I formally investigate the proposal that banking regulation could
benefit from price information (e.g., Flannery et al. 2010). I show that banking regu-
lation can potentially benefit from financial market information (e.g., from bank bond
prices or credit default swap spreads) and help prevent bank default. However, a gen-
eral lesson from the analysis is that regulatory action informed by market prices can
never perfectly prevent any default in equilibrium. This is because if there is never de-
fault due to regulatory intervention, then asset prices cannot work as an early warning
system for regulators (which would require prices to change with bank health) and
at the same time accurately reflect the zero probability of default (which would re-
quire prices not to change in bank health). Thus, market-based intervention has to
find a balance between obtaining more information from the market and exploiting
that information.
In the context of central banking, I build on the example of Bernanke andWoodford
(1997), who showed that an inflation targeting CB cannot use information from asset
prices, and show that selection of different assets solves the self-defeating prophecy
problem. Going beyond the three applications of banking regulation, corporate pre-
diction markets, and central banking, the final part of the paper discusses asset design
more generally. In particular, I obtain first answers to the more general questions of
when there exists a possible asset design that allows for information revelation in
equilibrium and what general guidelines for asset design one should follow.
These applications illustrate that the results of this paper are useful to identify
situations where policymakers can use financial market information, and in designing
institutions/assets that allow for better information revelation. Moreover, the problem
raised here is a more fundamental challenge for the possibility of informationally
efficient markets. Financial market prices may not reflect trader information even if
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all traders have perfect information, are perfectly rational, and obtain their perfect
information for free. Thus, the self-defeating prophecy problem is a nonbehavioral
challenge for informational efficiency. Finally, I also derive a necessary and sufficient
condition for the existence of partially revealing equilibria, which adds to the existing
literature which almost exclusively investigated fully revealing equilibria.
Related literature. Probably the most related paper is Bond et al. (2010). The authors
consider the problem where a board of directors has no or only imperfect informa-
tion about the quality of their agent, the company CEO, whereas traders have perfect
information. A low-quality CEO reduces the firm value, hence should be replaced
to increase the firm value, whereas medium- and high-quality CEOs should not be
replaced, since the intervention is costly. In this setting, there is a difficulty in infer-
ring CEO quality from the company stock price, which is a function of the company
value, if traders know that the board might react to it. In the language of this paper,
they describe a self-defeating prophecy and situations where it can be resolved. Bond
et al. (2010) is specific in several dimensions such as perfect information for traders,
binary intervention, or additive separability in the asset payoff function. The current
paper generalizes to more flexible trader information structures (allowing traders in-
dividually or collectively to be imperfectly informed), asset payoff functions, and
arbitrary policymaker preferences. Thus, the model presented here unifies their par-
ticular model and others in the literature and derives the necessary and sufficient con-
dition for the possibility of revealing equilibria in this more general setting. It thereby
explains the underlying reason why financial markets may fail to reveal information:
the policymaker reaction makes the pricing problem a self-defeating prophecy.
Bernanke and Woodford (1997), in an extension of the Woodford (1994) model,
presented the first example (to my knowledge) where revelation may fail in finan-
cial market/policymaker interaction. They consider a CB that attempts to infer a state
variable θ from private forecasts or forecasts implicit in asset prices to reach a con-
stant inflation target. Forecasters directly observe θ , the CB does not. In their static
model, there is no rational expectations equilibrium (REE) that fully reveals θ to the
CB. Again, their application is an example of a self-defeating prophecy.
Birchler and Facchinetti (2007) address a similar problem in banking supervision,
and give a nice description of the “double endogeneity” problem of asset values af-
fecting prices and prices affecting asset values via policy. They model a kind of pre-
diction market that predicts bank failure, and the banking supervisor can react to in-
formation contained in these asset prices. As in the models above, full revelation may
fail to occur because forward looking traders take into account that the supervisor will
react to prices.
The setting considered here is related to the recent literature on contingent capi-
tal with market triggers. The idea of contingent capital with market triggers is that
information in prices (typically about financial health of a bank) is used for real
decisions (convert debt into equity, helping struggling banks raise equity), but this
in turn affects asset values (returns to equity are diluted). The argument for mar-
ket triggers is that they provide more current information than accounting measures,
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which tend to have a considerable lag. The contingent capital models (Prescott 2012,
Sundaresan and Wang 2015) can also suffer from equilibrium nonexistence similar
to the self-defeating prophecies problem described here. The main difference is that
real decisions in these models are not made by a utility maximizing policymaker, but
by a mechanical rule that reacts to market prices.
All of the above papers consider the problem of information revelation to a real de-
cision maker by a noiseless financial market. Siemroth (2019) considers the problem
of self-defeating prophecies in markets with noise, where a standard CARA-normal
noisy rational expectations model is extended with a decision maker and asset values
are endogenous to the real decision.While this model with noise may be conceptually
superior to a model without noise, the model here is more general in various dimen-
sions such as information structures and asset payoff functions. Bond and Goldstein
(2015) also consider price informativeness in a noisy financial market with policy-
maker intervention, but their model does not feature self-defeating prophecies.
The current paper contributes to the growing literature of the real effects of finan-
cial markets via an informational channel, which mostly consists of studies without
self-defeating prophecies. In most of this literature, the “real effect” is the financial
market information impact on corporate decisions, as in Dow and Gorton (1997),
Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999), Goldstein and Guembel (2008), Foucault and
Gehrig (2008), Goldstein et al. (2013), Edmans et al. (2015), and Dow et al. (2017).
1. THE MODEL
1.1 Setup
Assets. Consider a financial market with a single riskless asset with return normal-
ized to 1 (“cash”), and a single risky asset. The optimal policy and the risky asset
value depend on a state variable θ , which is the realization of a random variable dis-
tributed according to a common prior distribution on support , where  contains at
least two elements. A policymaker sets a policy i ∈ I. The value of the risky asset is
a function a :  × I → R, determined by state θ and policy i. Throughout I assume
 ⊆ R, whereas policy I may be any set with possibly multidimensional elements.
Traders and trader information. The financial market consists of a mass 1 con-
tinuum of risk-neutral traders3 with a common prior distribution over θ . Every trader
j ∈ [0, 1] receives a signal s j on the realization of the state variable θ . The vector of
signals s = {s j} j∈[0,1] is distributed according to density f (s|θ ) = f (s|θ ′)∀θ = θ ′ ∈
. This formulation allows for the standard case of i.i.d. signals, or possibly corre-
lated signals among traders. Since different trader signal profiles s can contain the
same information, denote the summary statistic of the signal profile s by s, and the
3. The results would be the same if we assumed the same well-behaved risk-averse preferences for
all traders with the risky asset being in zero net supply. As is well known, a fully revealing equilibrium in
this case is a no trade equilibrium with the asset price equal to the expected asset value. With risk-averse
preferences and positive asset supply, the analysis would be qualitatively similar, although with a risk
premium in the price function.
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Fig 1. Timeline with Traders and Policymaker.
set of all possible unique realizations of s by S, so that ∀s = s′ ∈ S : h(θ |s) = h(θ |s′),
where h is the conditional probability density function of θ . s is a sufficient statistic
for signal profile s if and only if h(θ |s) = h(θ |s). The following are three examples
of commonly used information structures with corresponding summary statistic that
are captured by this setup.
Example 1.
1. All traders receive perfect signals, that is, s j = θ for all j, as, for example, in
Bernanke and Woodford (1997) or Bond et al. (2010). The summary statistic is
s = θ .
2. State θ ∈ {0, 1} is binomially distributed, s j ∈ {0, 1}, and traders receive imper-
fect i.i.d. signals, that is, 1 > Pr(s j = 1|θ = 1) = Pr(s j = 0|θ = 0) > 1/2 for
all j. The sufficient statistic is s = ∫ s jdj.
3. The state space is the entire real line, θ ∈ R, traders receive normal i.i.d. signals
s j ∼ N (θ, σ 2) with σ 2 > 0. The sufficient statistic is s =
∫
s jdj.
Price function. In the remainder of the paper, I will focus on the revelation of trader
information s to the policymaker. Let p(s) : S → R be a price function mapping the
sufficient statistic of trader information s into an asset price. For example, a(θ, i) may
represent the value of a company, depending on economic fundamentals θ and some
actions of the CEO i, while p(s) is the price of the publicly traded company stock if
traders received information s about θ .
Timing. The timing of decisions is illustrated in Figure 1: first, trading among
all j leads to a market price p(s), then, observing the price, the policymaker sets i.
The results would be the same for simultaneous trading and policymaking, since the
policy can condition on the price.
Policymaker information. In this paper, the policymaker knows the prior distribu-
tion of state θ , but is otherwise uninformed about the realization of θ . Since the focus
is on determining if and when policymakers can learn from financial markets, it is
clearly necessary that policymakers do not directly observe θ , otherwise there would
be no need to learn from asset prices. But even if the policymaker were imperfectly
informed about θ , it would typically not change the problem of inferring informa-
tion from market prices. The more general case with imperfectly informed policy-
maker is analyzed in the online appendix; the seemingly small addition of the policy-
maker signal complicates the analysis without adding much economic insight. As a
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general rule, whenever the policymaker signal does not rule out any state θ ∈ ,4 then
full revelation of trader information is possible in the augmented model of the online
appendix (with imperfectly informed policymaker) if and only if it is also possible
in this model with uninformed policymaker (Corollary 4 in the online appendix). In
short, the setting here assumes that traders know something about θ that the poli-
cymaker would like to know, which motivates the question if and when traders can
reveal that information via asset prices.
Policymaker preferences. The utility function u represents the rational preference
ordering of the policymaker over the tuple (θ, i). Thus, the utility maximizing policy
i can—and in the interesting cases will—depend on the realization of the state θ . The
utility function also includes possible costs of intervention. Consequently, if trader




To simplify the exposition, I assume that the optimal policy i(s) exists and is unique
for every s ∈ S. Results can be adapted for multiple solutions and mixed policy strate-
gies in a straightforward manner. For nontriviality, I assume the optimal policy i(s)
varies for all realizations of s, so the policymaker is interested in the trader informa-
tion s.
Welfare interpretation. The policymaker utility may be thought of as represent-
ing the welfare of all (unmodeled) nontrader agents in the economy. This would be
the case, for example, with the policymaker as a benevolent public agent who aims
at maximizing nontrader social welfare. In this interpretation, more information is
better for nontrader welfare, so the question addressed here is not merely about the
informativeness of prices, but also about social welfare in the real sector.
The crucial object. Define v(s) : S → A, the expected asset value at the optimal
policy based on s,
v(s) := E[a(θ, i(s))|s]. (2)
The objects i(s) and v(s) are defined as if s is known to the policymaker, even though
it is not. The reason is that once prices are fully revealing (see Definition 2), then
s is known to the policymaker. Hence, the policymaker will implement policy i(s)
leading to expected asset value v(s). These are reactions that forward looking traders
are going to anticipate if prices are fully revealing.
Given the model, policy i cannot actually be conditioned on s directly, only on
p(s), so the resulting asset value is a(θ, i(p(s))). The difference is crucial, as i(s)
(and by extension v(s)) conditions on the exogenous s, whereas i(p) conditions
on the endogenous price function. Equilibrium (to be formally defined later) will
4. As is the case, for example, if θ ∈ R and the policymaker signal sp is normally distributed, putting
a positive density on each θ ∈ R.
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require policy given beliefs to be optimal. Policymaker behavior, in particular u, is
common knowledge.
The next definitions introduce two properties of price functions.
Definition 1. A price function p(s) is accurate if and only if
p(s) = E[a(θ, i(p))|p(s) = p, s j] for all j. (3)
In words, an accurate price function requires that asset prices equal expected asset
values from the perspective of all traders, where the information set of trader j is
both the information contained in prices and his private information s j. The condition
can be interpreted as requiring no systematic mispricing, which becomes clearer in
Lemma 1.
In the present setting, s can only be indirectly revealed to the policymaker via price
p = p(s). If the policymaker knows the price function, which she does in equilibrium,
then s can always be inferred from price p if the price function p(s) is invertible.
Definition 2. A price function p(s) is fully revealing if and only if p(s) is invertible.
The next lemma establishes that if a price function is fully revealing, then accuracy
implies p(s) = v(s) and vice versa (all proofs are in Appendix A). Hence, if prices
are fully revealing and if the asset should not be mispriced from the perspective of
any of the traders, then prices must equal the expected asset value given all trader
information v(s).
Lemma 1. A fully revealing price function p(s) is accurate if and only if p(s) = v(s).
1.2 The Possibility of Information Revelation via Prices
This section asks under which conditions a function p(s) exists that fulfills two
properties: full revelation and accuracy, given that the policymaker makes inferences
from this price function. There is no microfoundation for this price function yet, that
is, the section does not explain how the price function arises in some specified trading
game or equilibrium concept. This foundation is provided in Section 1.4. The anal-
ysis is separated in this way to highlight that the impossibility of fully revealing and
accurate prices does not depend on this microfoundation nor the equilibrium con-
cept. Instead, under some conditions it is mathematically impossible to find a price
function that is both fully revealing and accurate.
The main question is: In which economic environments is it possible for a price
function to reveal s (Definition 2) and price accurately (Definition 1) at the same time?
Without full revelation, the policymaker has inferior information and may implement
suboptimal policies, and without accurate prices, traders might lose money, hence
might be better off not trading. Given correct policymaker beliefs about the price
function p(s), Theorem 1 shows that this is possible if and only if v(s), the expected
asset value given optimal policy based on trader information s, is invertible.
CHRISTOPH SIEMROTH : 9
Theorem 1 (Possibility of full revelation and accurate prices). Suppose the policy-
maker knows function p(s) and maximizes expected utility. Then a fully revealing
and accurate price function exists if and only if {a(θ, i), u(θ, i), f (s|θ )} are such that
v(s) = Eθ [a(θ, i(s))|s] is invertible.
Theorem 1 completely characterizes the existence of fully revealing and accurate
price functions in terms of policymaker preferences u(θ, i) (which determine the re-
action function i(s)), asset payoff functions a(θ, i), and trader information structures
f (s|θ ) (defining s ∈ S). If there exists no price function that is both accurate and fully
revealing, then such a price function cannot arise in equilibrium no matter the equi-
librium concept.
The result is mathematically almost trivial but economically important. It is math-
ematically straightforward because a function cannot, at the same time, be invertible
and not invertible. If the asset value given the policymaker reaction to trader infor-
mation v(s) is not invertible, then a price function p(s) cannot reveal the trader infor-
mation (which requires invertibility) and accurately price the asset (which requires
p(s) = v(s), i.e., noninvertibility).
What is the interpretation of the necessary and sufficient condition, that is, when
does “learning” from asset prices work and when does it not? Suppose for a moment
that the combined trader information is θ , that is, s = θ . It is easiest to start with the
standard setup, where the asset value is only a function of the (exogenous) funda-
mentals: a(θ, i) = θ . Here the state variable exactly equals the asset value. A larger
fundamental always corresponds to a larger asset value. Thus, it is easily possible to
find a price function that both reveals θ and equals the asset value, namely, p(θ ) = θ .
In the present setting, however, asset values may depend on a policy i(p(θ )) which in
turn depends on the information contained in the price function p(θ ). As in the intro-
ductory example, a higher price might reveal information that leads the policymaker
to enact a policy that decreases the asset value, thus punishing traders for trading at
high prices. And a lower price might indicate information that leads to a policy with
higher asset value, thus again traders lose money due to the asset price/value differ-
ential. Consequently, the crucial difference to the standard setup is that asset values
are endogenous to a player who reacts to asset prices, which makes it impossible to
match asset values and prices if v(θ ) is not invertible.
The best interpretation of the impossibility of fully revealing and accurate prices is
that of a self-defeating prophecy. When trading, traders try to forecast the future asset
value. Given risk neutrality and a competitive market, prices should equal expected
asset values, so market prices can be interpreted as the market forecast of the future
asset value. However, if v(s) is not invertible, then it is impossible to make a cor-
rect forecast in every state if that forecast reveals the state, because the policymaker
reacts to the forecasts (prices) after they have been made and falsifies the forecasts:
prediction of a high asset value triggers a low asset value, and prediction of a low
asset value triggers a higher asset value. Consequently, noninvertibility of v(s) is a
situation where policymaker preferences and trader preferences (making zero profits
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(a) (b)
Fig 2. Examples for Noninvertible Asset Values at the Optimal Policy v(θ ) under Full Information
in a competitive market) are not aligned: it is impossible that both traders and the
policymaker get what they want given this market mechanism.
1.3 Examples from the Literature
In several papers with policymaker/trader interaction from the literature section,
traders have perfect information about the state variable θ . It can easily be verified
that invertibility of v(θ ) is not fulfilled in these papers (see Figure 2). For example
(adapting their notation), in Bernanke and Woodford (1997)’s static model, the CB
wants to cancel out all variance due to inflation pressures θ , so that the asset value
(assumed to equal the inflation rate) given the optimal policy using trader information
is v(θ ) = θ + i = c for some constant c. Yet if θ were revealed by a price function
that changes in θ , then this price function cannot equal the actual asset value c in all
states θ ∈ . In Bond et al. (2010) (similar in Prescott 2012), the policy variable is
binary, and an intervention is value increasing: a(θ, i = 1) > a(θ, i = 0). Moreover,
the asset value increases in θ . The optimal policy calls for i = 1 if and only if θ ≤ θ̂
for some threshold θ̂ , hence v(θ ) has a discontinuous downward jump at θ̂ , which
makes it noninvertible (see Figure 2).
Hence, the underlying problem—noninvertibility of v(θ )—is the same in these
papers. Despite the same problem, preferences of the policymaker differ, which shows
the problem of full revelation with self-defeating prophecies is not due to specific
policymaker goals. In Bernanke and Woodford (1997), a CB wants to minimize the
variance of inflation, and in Bond et al. (2010) a board of directors wants to maximize
firm value minus intervention cost. In Prescott (2012), the policy is determined by a
capital conversion rule.
Despite noninvertibility of v(θ ) in Bond et al. (2010), they show that full revelation
may be possible under some strict conditions on the policymaker information. This
is the only application in the literature I am aware of where the assumption that the
policymaker is informed (in a specific way) makes a difference whether or not prices
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can be revealing, and the more general necessary and sufficient condition in the case
of a partially informed policymaker is derived in the online appendix.
1.4 Existence of Fully Revealing Rational Expectations Equilibria
This section investigates whether full revelation can occur in an REE. That is, under
which conditions can the financial market aggregate and reveal private information
to the policymaker in a competitive equilibrium?
Recall we have a continuum of risk-neutral traders j ∈ [0, 1]. To obtain finite net
demands, assume that each trader is budget constrained with a budget w > 0, and
assume that each trader owns one unit of the risky asset and cannot short-sell, which
sets a lower bound on net demands: x ≥ −1. A rational expectations equilibrium in
this setting is defined as follows.
Definition 3. An REE with policymaker consists of
i. Optimal trader (net) demands for the risky asset given their private information
and the information revealed in prices,
x j(p, s j ) = argmax
x
Eθ [x(a(θ, i(p)) − p)|p(s) = p, s j]∀ j ∈ [0, 1]
s.t. xp ≤ w, x ≥ −1.
(4)




Eθ [u(θ, i)|p(s) = p], (5)
iii. And a price function p(s) that clears the market for every s ∈ S, that is,
∫ 1
0
x j(p = p(s), s j )dj = 0∀s ∈ S. (6)
Condition (i) of Definition 3 requires that trader demands maximize the expected
utility, based on their private information s j and the information contained in equi-
librium prices p(s). This condition is standard except traders recognize that the asset
value a(θ, i(p)) is endogenous to the policy reaction to price p, which is the straight-
forward equilibrium generalization for this setting. Condition (ii) is new since stan-
dard models do not feature a nontrader player. The policymaker chooses a policy that
maximizes her expected utility given the information contained in equilibrium prices
p(s). Condition (iii) is a standard market clearing condition.
It turns out that the same condition which determines the existence of a fully re-
vealing and accurate price function is also necessary and sufficient for the existence
of a fully revealing REE. This is because Theorem 1 assumed that the policymaker
knows p(s) and acts optimally given her information, which is now an equilibrium
12 : MONEY, CREDIT AND BANKING
requirement, and accurate prices now follow from utility maximization of traders and
market clearing (i.e., traders do not clear the market if asset prices are not accurate).
Proposition 1. A fully revealing REE exists if and only if {a(θ, i), u(θ, i), f (s|θ )}
are such that v(s) is invertible.
Thus, according to the REE concept, financial markets can both aggregate and
reveal all trader information s, if and only if v(s) is invertible.5 Hence, there are situ-
ations where markets cannot be strong-form informationally efficient, that is, prices
do not reflect all trader information. If prices fully revealed trader information, then
in at least one state there would be mispricing, which introduces incentives to exploit
the mispricing, and consequently traders do not support a fully revealing price func-
tion in equilibrium. Even in the most extreme case, where all traders perfectly know
the state of the world (s j = θ∀ j) and perfectly know policymaker behavior, prices
cannot reflect trader information if invertibility of v(s) fails to hold. The problem is
not an informational one—traders know everything. Instead, accurate prices and full
revelation are mutually exclusive, because the policymaker de facto “prefers to fal-
sify trader forecasts.” This result is in strong contrast to the standard models without
policymaker, where asset values are exogenous and existence of fully revealing REE
is generic (see, e.g., Radner 1979 or Allen 1981), that is, markets are (strong-form)
informationally efficient.
Note that the fully revealing equilibrium, if it exists, is Pareto-efficient. The
price reveals the union of all trader information, so there is symmetric information
among traders in equilibrium. The equilibrium is a competitive one, so by the first
welfare theorem the allocation among traders is Pareto-efficient (Grossman 1981).
Moreover, the policymaker receives all information that is available in the econ-
omy and—by the equilibrium requirement—implements the optimal policy, thus
maximizing her utility. Consequently, a social planner with access to the combined
information in the economy cannot improve on allocation and policy in the fully
revealing REE. Thus, full revelation has positive welfare consequences in the setting
considered here, and not just for traders, but for the real economy as well, as it
benefits from the information of the financial market.
1.5 Partially Revealing Rational Expectations Equilibria
This section discusses equilibrium existence if fully revealing equilibria do not
exist, by deriving a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of partially
revealing equilibria when traders are perfectly informed about the state.6
5. The online appendix shows that the same condition is necessary and sufficient for full revelation
using the Perfect Bayesian equilibrium concept in a continuum economy if traders receive perfectly cor-
related signals, so the results are relevant beyond the REE concept.
6. Investigating partially revealing equilibria with other signal structures would require us to specify
the distribution of information among traders in more detail, which is beyond the scope of this paper. In the
main section, focusing on fully revealing equilibria, the distribution of private information among traders
did not matter since all information is revealed in equilibrium. This is different when analyzing partially
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Discussing partially revealing equilibria will require some additional notation and
the concept of set partitions.
Definition 4. A partitionP of the set of all possible states is a set of subsets, with
its subsets (“parts”) I ∈ P such that
• all parts of the partition together span  (∪I∈PI = ),
• all parts of the partition are disjoint, so that any state θ ∈  belongs to exactly
one part of the partition (I ∩ I ′ = ∅∀I = I ′ ∈ P ), and
• no part of the partition is empty (∅ /∈ P ).
Hence, a partition divides the set of states  into separate and disjoint parts, which
are subsets of . A subset I ∈ P may include one or more elements (states). Set
partitions are a convenient way to formalize the notion of partial revelation: In a
partially revealing equilibrium, the price function reveals a part of the partition I of
, that is, reveals that the realized state is one of the states in I, but not which. Hence,
revealing the part of the partition is not equivalent to fully revealing the state if that
part includes more than one state. A partially revealing equilibrium therefore must
have the same price in all states that are part of the same partition, that is, p(θ ) = p(θ ′)
for all θ = θ ′ ∈ I.
Adapting the earlier notation, let i(I ) denote the optimal policy choice if the pol-
icymakers knows the realized state is part of I (but not which state in that part of
the partition). We can now state the necessary and sufficient condition for the exis-
tence of a partially revealing equilibrium (a special case of which is a nonrevealing
equilibrium).
Proposition 2. Suppose traders are perfectly informed (s j = θ∀ j). A partially re-
vealing equilibrium exists if and only if there exists a partition P of  such that
1. ∃I ∈ P : |I| > 1, and
2. v(I ) = E[a(θ, i(I ))|θ ∈ I] is invertible for all I ∈ P , and
3. a(θ, i(I )) = a(θ ′, i(I )) for all θ = θ ′ ∈ I, for all I ∈ P .
Hence, a partially revealing equilibrium exists if and only if the state space can be
partitioned such that three conditions are fulfilled: First, at least one part of the parti-
tion includes more than one state, otherwise it would be a fully revealing equilibrium.
Second, revealing parts of the partition leads to a policymaker reaction such that
the expected asset values for each part of the partition is different. This condition (and
the reason why it is necessary for equilibrium) is very similar to the case of fully re-
vealing equilibria, and indeed this is not surprising when partially revealing equilibria
are viewed as “fully revealing parts of a partition of ” (rather than fully revealing
the state). That is, the equilibrium fully reveals groups of states rather than individ-
ual states. The condition is necessary because without it, traders would not clear the
revealing equilibria that may retain asymmetry of information among traders, so that the distribution of
information matters for market clearing.
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market for such a price function, as prices differ between parts of the partition but
asset values do not. An interpretation of this is the self-defeating prophecy problem
as before: Partially revealing information leads to a policy reaction that makes traders
not want to reveal that information.
Third, within each part of the partition, the asset values from the perspective of the
traders need to be constant, that is, cannot change with the state. This is a requirement
that did not appear in the discussion of fully revealing equilibria, because it refers to
the nonrevealing component of the equilibrium. In a partially revealing equilibrium,
there exists at least one part of the partition with multiple states such that the price
is the same for all states in that part. Hence, the policymaker cannot distinguish the
states in that part of the partition, and must use the same policy in all of these states.
But traders can distinguish these states, so for this to be an equilibrium, the asset
value—evaluated at the partially informed policy choice i(I )—needs to be the same
for all states θ ∈ I in the part. If it was not, then traders would not clear the market
for such a price function, because asset values diverge from prices in at least one
state in that part. Thus, this condition ensures that traders are willing to sustain a
price function that withholds information about which state in the part realized. To
illustrate this, consider the following example.
Example 2. Bond and Goldstein (2015) consider a setting (simplified here) where
the asset value is a(θ, i) = c+ iwith c being independent of θ , that is, the asset value
does not directly depend on the state θ , but may nevertheless be affected through the
policy action i. In their interpretation, the asset is the stock of a firm whose value
depends on a government intervention (such as a cash injection) which may vary
by state.
If the policymaker is not informed in this setting, then if the price reveals no in-
formation, the policymaker has to take the same action i(∅) in every state. Thus, the
asset value would be a(θ, i) = c+ i(∅), which is independent of the state and thus
fulfills condition 3 of Proposition 2. Hence, there is a nonrevealing equilibrium with
p(θ ) = c+ i(∅)∀θ ∈ . And, if policymaker preferences are such that i(θ ) is invert-
ible, then a fully revealing equilibrium exists in addition. 
Consequently, a partially revealing equilibrium may exist alongside a fully reveal-
ing one, since the conditions in Propositions 1 and 2 are not mutually exclusive. If
they coexist, then a partially revealing equilibrium can be interpreted as the market
withholding some information that the policymaker needs, which is Pareto-inferior
since traders make zero expected profits in any competitive equilibrium, but the pol-
icymaker is better off in a fully revealing one. It may also be that only one type of
equilibrium exists or neither.7 For specific applications, it is a matter of checking the
conditions in Propositions 1 and 2, which will be illustrated in the following section.
A very easy-to-check sufficient condition for nonexistence of any partially revealing
7. And multiple different partially revealing equilibria may exist, whereas the fully revealing equilib-
rium is unique if the policy reaction i(s) is unique.
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equilibrium, and one for the existence of a nonrevealing equilibrium, follows from
Proposition 2:
Corollary 1. Suppose traders are perfectly informed (s j = θ∀ j).
i. If the asset is such that a(t, i) = a(t ′, i)∀t = t ′ ∈ ,∀i ∈ I, then there exists no
partially revealing REE.
ii. If the asset is such that a(t, i) = a(t ′, i)∀t = t ′ ∈ ,∀i ∈ I, then there exists a
nonrevealing REE.
2. APPLICATIONS
2.1 Design of Assets in Corporate Prediction Markets
Corporate prediction markets are designed to elicit information dispersed among
employees about business-relevant future outcomes such as whether project dead-
lines can be met, what next quarter’s demand for a product will be, or whether a
competitor will enter a particular market segment. Prediction markets typically trade
simple assets whose value depends on these outcomes. The information revealed by
these markets is most useful if it is used to improve corporate decisions. However,
this “policymaker” reaction to market prices is exactly what can create self-defeating
prophecies, because it also affects asset values.
One example where these prediction markets affect company policy is mentioned
in Cowgill and Zitzewitz (2015). Ford decided against introducing several new prod-
ucts after prediction market forecasts revealed that these would not be popular among
consumers. Indeed, improving decisions was the main reason for using these markets:
“FordMotor Company [turned to prediction markets] to improve their ability to make
decisions that would be in line with customer interests” (HPC Wire 2011).
The following example investigates the project deadline assets that are used in
corporate prediction markets to determine whether a project will finish on time and
whether intervention may be necessary. The empirical paper of Cowgill and Zitzewitz
(2015) describes these markets with institutional details. The analysis here shows for
the first time (to the best of my knowledge) that these markets are designed in a way
that undermine the incentives of traders to reveal their information. An alternative
asset design can fix this problem.
Example 3. A project in a company may miss the deadline (θ = 1) or it may
meet the deadline (θ = 0) with the currently available resources. This is the “state
of the project.” Insiders—for example, the employees who work on the project—
know the state (s j = θ ), while the manager (policymaker) does not. The deadline
asset in the corporate prediction market pays 1 if and only if the deadline is missed,
and 0 otherwise. The manager can react to information about whether the deadline
will be met: i = 0 means the project does not receive additional resources (more
manpower, funds, etc.), and i = 1 means the project receives additional resources
that definitely ensure completion on time. The manager does not want to commit
16 : MONEY, CREDIT AND BANKING
additional resources unless it is necessary, since it is costly. Consequently, the asset
value is a(θ, i) = 1{i = 0 ∧ θ = 1}, that is, the project misses the deadline if and only
if the manager does not commit additional resources (i = 0) and the project misses
the deadline without additional resources (θ = 1).
To determine whether full revelation is possible in equilibrium, calculate v(θ ),
that is, the asset value if θ (the trader information) were revealed to the manager.
Clearly, v(θ = 1) = 0, since the manager prevents missing the deadline by assigning
more resources, i(θ = 1) = 1. Moreover, v(θ = 0) = 0 with i(θ = 0) = 0. Thus, the
deadline is never missed, the v(θ )-function is not invertible in θ , and a self-defeating
prophecy prevents revelation of trader information: Traders anticipate that revelation
of θ = 1 (amissed deadline) triggers a policy reaction that prevents the deadline being
missed, hence they would lose money by buying the asset.
How can corporations solve this problem? Since they are free to design other as-
sets in their own markets, a simple adjustment fixes the problem. Consider another
asset with value a(θ, i) = i, that is, the asset pays $1 if and only if the company
commits additional resources. The v(θ )-function is v(θ = 1) = i(θ = 1) = 1 and
v(θ = 0) = i(θ = 0) = 0, that is, it is invertible. Thus, instead of designing an as-
set that predicts the outcome (deadline missed yes/no), which the company might
seek to change depending on state and information, another asset simply predicts the
intervention decision. In equilibrium, traders have incentives to forecast the optimal
policy for the policymaker, and this forecast is self-fulfilling, since the policymaker
wants to follow the “recommendation.”
While this alternative asset is preferable in terms of trader incentives, this solution
is not perfect, since there exists another equilibrium, which is not fully revealing (see
conditions in Proposition 2). Suppose the prior beliefs of the manager are such that
she commits additional resources unless she receives information that it is unneces-
sary. The price function p(θ = 1) = p(θ = 0) = 1 is uninformative, since the price
is identical in both states, and accurate, since the manager will commit additional
resources without additional information; it is an equilibrium. Yet clearly the man-
ager does not implement the optimal policy of committing additional resources if and
only if it is necessary. Similarly, if the prior beliefs imply not to commit additional
resources, then p(θ = 1) = p(θ = 0) = 0 is an uninformative and suboptimal equi-
librium.
The best theoretical solution, the asset a(θ, i) = θ , is not practically implementable
in the case of project deadline prediction markets, since θ (the information to be
revealed) is the outcome in the absence of intervention, that is, a counterfactual that
is not ex post contractible if additional resources are committed.
One caveat is that the model uses a competitive equilibrium concept, where traders
act as price takers. In very small corporate prediction markets, this may not be
realistic: A single trader can affect prices, which possibly introduces incentives
for price manipulation. A lot of these corporate markets at Google and Ford are
quite large (Cowgill and Zitzewitz 2015)—at Google, all employees were eligible
to participate—so the price taker assumption is plausible in many cases. Moreover,
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there is the potential problem that employees might seek to manipulate outcomes for
financial gain, which is beyond the scope of this paper, but discussed in Ottaviani and
Sørensen (2007). Overall, the lesson here is that even if employees do not manipu-
late these markets, then they might not work as management tools if they are poorly
designed due to self-defeating prophecies.
2.2 Market Information for Banking Supervision
There is considerable asymmetric information between banks and the authorities
that are tasked to supervise and regulate these banks. With costly audits, supervisors
can reduce this information asymmetry, but still empirical evidence shows that fi-
nancial markets prices—especially of bank equity and bank debt (bonds)—contain
information that bank supervisors do not have (e.g., Berger, Davies, and Flannery
2000 or Gunther et al. 2001). Thus, these papers argue that financial markets as a
whole could potentially provide information that regulators would like to have, just
as is assumed in this paper. Indeed, this is also recognized and practiced by regulators:
“[U]sing market information in supervision, the Federal Reserve and other regulatory
agencies already monitor subordinated debt yields and issuance patterns in evaluating
the condition of large banking organizations” (Greenspan 2001). Moreover, market
prices such as those of credit default swaps appear to incorporate crucial information
earlier than agency credit ratings (e.g., Flannery et al. 2010). But this paper shows that
whether traders share their information in equilibrium depends on what regulators do
with the information inferred from financial market prices.
The main interest of banking supervisors is to maintain the stability of the bank-
ing sector and to prevent failures of systemically important banks that might require
a costly bailout. Thus, potentially market information could help indicate problems
with particular banks, which ideally helps the regulator to intervene before it is too
late. Consider the following simple example of market information in banking super-
vision.
Example 4. First consider the case of no regulator. Suppose a bank issued bonds,
whose value is a(θ, i) = min{θ,F}, where θ ≥ 0 is bank health and F > 0 is the
face value of the bond. If θ < F , then the bank cannot repay all of its obligations
and the bond value falls. Suppose traders observe bank health s j = θ . While there
is no equilibrium that reveals θ , there is one where the market price reveals whether
there will be (partial) default. The asset value based on trader information is v(θ ) =
min{θ,F}, so prices p(θ ) = v(θ ) reveal whether θ > F or θ < F , that is, whether
the bank is unable to repay in full, and if so it reveals bank health θ .
Now suppose we introduce an uninformed regulator who can intervene with ac-
tion i ≥ 0. Action i could be any of the possible interventions such as forced recap-
italization or mandating dividend restrictions to maintain equity cushions, etc. The
intervention improves the bank’s health, so the asset value is a(θ, i) = min{θ + i,F}
(i.e., the regulator improves health to F if θ < F or does not intervene if θ ≥ F).
Hence, the interpretation of θ is now “bank health absent intervention.” Suppose the
regulator wants to prevent losses to debt holders (e.g., to prevent contagion), which
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could be described by the reaction function i1(θ ) = max{F − θ, 0}. Given such a re-
action function, forward looking traders—anticipating the regulatory response if their
information was revealed—value the bond as
v1(θ ) = min{θ + i1(θ ),F} = F, (7)
that is, at face value independent of bank health, so there exists no revealing equi-
librium (Proposition 1). Thus, without further features in the model, traders will not
share their information knowing there is a regulator that perfectly reacts to market
information about bank health to prevent default. The assumption that the regulator
can simply “fix” any bank issues she knows about θ is a strong one, yet the more
general point stands: Any intervention that is informed by market prices and thereby
successfully prevents any default cannot work in equilibrium, because the final asset
value would not vary with the state θ , yet market prices must vary in bank health θ
in order to reveal it (this is also recognized by Birchler and Facchinetti 2007). This
point applies also to other assets whose value depends on bank health, such as credit
default swaps. Thus, interestingly, imperfect interventions have the upside that they
might keep the information-revelation incentives of traders alive.
To see this, suppose the regulator cannot perfectly restore bank health to full
solvency, but rather imperfectly reacts with i2(θ ) = max{F − θ − ε(θ ), 0}, where
ε(θ ) > 0 means there is underreaction relative to perfect intervention. This imperfec-
tion could be due to costs associated with interventions. Also assume−1 < ε′(θ ) < 0
for technical reasons. Then we have an asset value (anticipating the policy reaction




F if θ ≥ F (no intervention needed),
θ if F > θ ≥ F − ε(θ ) (needed intervention does not occur),
F − ε(θ ) if F − ε(θ ) > θ (imperfect intervention occurs).
(8)
This function is plotted in Figure 3. Hence, since F − ε(θ ) is invertible in θ (assured
by ε′(θ ) < 0 and ε′(θ ) > −1, so that F − ε(θ ) = θ has a unique solution), the price
function p(θ ) = v(θ ) reveals the realization of θ in the subintervals of θ where inter-
vention occurs, namely, in θ < F − ε(θ ) (see Figure 3). This is a partially revealing
equilibrium. The fact that θ is not revealed for θ ≥ F is not critical since the regulator
would not want to change her action in this subinterval (i(θ ) = 0 for θ ≥ F), thus she
does not need to know the exact θ -realization. In summary, imperfect reactions from
the policymaker can make prices more informative, which might ultimately be better
for the policymaker, while perfect interventions may destroy the basis upon which
they operate.
In summary, while the empirical evidence suggests that the market as a whole pos-
sesses useful information for banking authorities, this information may not be re-
vealed to the same degree if the authorities rely more on this information in the future,
as it can damage trader incentives. A general point here is that market information
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Fig 3. The Asset Value v2(θ ) Given Imperfect Intervention i2(θ ) by the Regulator is Invertible in Bank Health θ for
θ < F .
Notes: θ∗ is defined as F − ε(θ∗ ) = θ∗. I is the region of θ where (imperfect) Intervention occurs, NI is the region where
No Intervention occurs but would be required, and NN is the region where intervention is Not Necessary.
cannot facilitate interventions that achieve full price stability, since the information
needed to intervene appropriately can only be transmitted by changing prices.
2.3 Information from Asset Prices for Monetary Policy
It is well known that CBs monitor asset prices, which can potentially reveal in-
formation about inflation expectations or future inflation shocks (e.g., Bernanke and
Woodford 1997). Moreover, a large literature on Taylor rules finds that CBs react to
asset prices, housing prices, or oil prices (e.g., Rigobon and Sack 2003; L’œillet and
Licheron 2012; Finocchiaro and Heideken 2013). Bernanke and Woodford (1997)
showed how a self-defeating prophecy (my term) can arise if the CB is inflation tar-
geting and reacts to trader information incorporated in asset prices. The next example
briefly makes their argument in simple terms and (new) shows how a different asset
can fix the problem.
Example 5. Suppose next period’s inflation rate is given by π = θ − i, where θ ∈ R
is a fundamental of the macroeconomy and i is the CB’s policy instrument (interest
rate). TheCB is inflation targeting, so it has a target of t ∈ R, which can be represented
with the utility function u(θ, i) = −(π − t )2.
Suppose traders observe the state of the economy θ , that is, s j = θ . Moreover,
suppose that there is an asset in the financial market whose (real) value depends on
the future inflation rate, like a government bond: a1(θ, i) = f (π ) with f (.) being
strictly decreasing. Bernanke and Woodford (1997) showed there is no REE in this
case. Using the methods from this paper, the optimal policy function is i(θ ) = θ − t.
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The expected asset value given this policy is v1(θ ) = f (π = t ), which is not invertible
in θ (indeed, it is constant). Thus, there is no informative equilibrium, because if the
CB were to learn θ , then the future inflation rate would equal the target rate, and any
asset whose value depends on the future inflation rate would have a constant value
(i.e., not change in θ ). But if the asset value does not change in θ , then a price function
that does change in θ (as required by full revelation) cannot be an equilibrium.
As in the case of the deadline corporate prediction market, using a different asset
with a different underlying can fix the problem of the self-defeating prophecy. Con-
sider the asset a2(θ, i) = i instead. The expected asset value given optimal policy
based on trader information is v2(θ ) = i(θ ) = θ − t, which is invertible in θ . Thus,
by Proposition 1, a fully revealing equilibrium exists. In other words, rather than us-
ing assets whose value depends on the future inflation rate, an inflation targeting CB
should look at interest rate futures. This is because the prices of these securities can
at the same time reveal information to the CB and be consistent with the policy re-
action to this information. However, by Corollary 1, there also exists a nonrevealing
equilibrium for a2, so the desirable equilibrium is not the only one.
Note that the model so far considered the existence of one asset whose value might
depend on (θ, i). Generalizing, if assets a1 and a2 exist in parallel, then in equilib-
rium the price of a2 would fully reveal θ , and then a1 could be priced at v1(θ ) even
though it is not invertible, since the trader information θ is already revealed by the
other asset. A similar point with an additional asset is made in Bond et al. (2010).
Thus, since interest rate futures do exist in most currencies, the problem raised by
Bernanke and Woodford (1997) may not be that severe. In general, a self-defeating
prophecy only arises if none of the existing assets have an invertible v-function. Con-
sequently, the self-defeating prophecy problem could be viewed as a consequence of
incomplete markets.
2.4 How to Design Assets that Promote Information Revelation
The previous subsections discussed specific applications whose lessons may not
always carry over to other applications. This section gives more general results on
asset design.
A natural question to ask is whether there always exists an asset a(.) for every
policymaker utility function u(.) so that there is a fully revealing equilibrium (i.e., so
that v(s) is invertible). In the case where the combined trader information is s = θ ,
and assuming away problems of contractibility for now, the answer is trivially “yes.”
The asset value function a(θ, i) = θ is always invertible in s = θ for any policymaker
utility function u(θ, i). Hence, since the problem of self-defeating prophecies results
from the policy reaction to the information revealed by asset prices, we can fix the
problem by making asset values independent of the policy (i.e., revert back to the
standard case of exogenous asset values).
From a practical perspective, this simple answer may not be satisfactory, as θ
may not be ex post verifiable or contractible. Hence, a financial asset—essentially
a contract promising payoffs depending on certain contingencies—could not directly
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condition on θ . For example, θ may be the CEO quality or effort that is never directly
observed but affects the firm (and stock) value. Thus, the question whether there al-
ways exists an asset that supports information revelation cannot be answered at this
level of generality, since the set of feasible assets depends on the specific application.
Still, the proposition in this section provides some general guidelines that can serve
as a recommendation for asset design. Moving beyond the trivial case where an as-
set can directly condition on θ , assume now that an outcome o :  × I → R is con-
tractible. This outcome is exogenous and cannot be affected by the asset designer.
Still, we can design an asset A : R → R which maps the observable outcome o(θ, i)
into an asset value.
Denote the set of all invertible functions A : R → R by A and the set of nonin-
vertible functions by A′. Moreover, denote the set of strictly increasing functions by
A ⊂ A and the set of strictly decreasing functions by A ⊂ A.
Proposition 3 (Asset design and full revelation). Consider the case of an observ-
able outcome o :  × I → R where the asset designer can choose any a(θ, i) =
A(o(θ, i)).
i. Suppose the combined trader information is perfect (s = θ ). If a noninvertible
function A′ ∈ A′ allows full revelation and accurate prices, then so does any
invertible function A ∈ A, but the converse does not hold.
ii. Suppose o(θ, i(s)) conditional on s can be ranked along s in a first-order
stochastic dominance sense, that is, o(θ, i(s))|s first-order stochastic dominates
o(θ, i(s′))|s′ or vice versa for any s = s′ ∈ S. Then any strictly increasing A ∈ A
or strictly decreasing A ∈ A allows for fully revealing and accurate prices, but
any nonmonotone A /∈ (A ∪ A) (and in particular any A′ ∈ A′) might not.
iii. Suppose s and θ have discrete distributions. Then there exists an asset payoff
function A : R → R with a fully revealing REE if and only if the probability
mass function of o(θ, i(s)) conditional on s is distinct for all s ∈ S.
Part (i) shows that invertible asset payoff functions A are never worse, but may be
better suited to promote fully revealing prices than noninvertible ones (in the sense
that a fully revealing equilibrium exists) if f (s|θ ) is such that the combined trader
information reveals θ , that is, if s = θ . Thus, in this case, we may say that invertible
asset payoff functions are “weakly better” in terms of information revelation. This is
because a noninvertible asset payoff function may “bunch” or “pool” several states
θ ∈  in a single asset value, thereby making it impossible to infer the state from the
asset value, precluding invertibility of v(s).
Example 6. To illustrate part (i), consider prediction markets (e.g., Wolfers and




1 if o(θ, i) ≥ T,
0 if o(θ, i) < T
(9)
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for a threshold T ∈ R, because the prices of these assets have a natural interpretation
as market probability forecasts. For example, such an asset could be used to forecast
future sales o(θ, i) = θ · i of a product in a specific time period. But if the range
of possible demand is  = R+, with i ≥ 0 for example being marketing activity,
then the state space dimension is infinitely larger than the asset value dimension.
Consequently, no fully revealing equilibrium exists, and such a prediction market
can at best reveal whether or not predicted sales are above the target, not what the
underlying demand for the product is exactly.
Part (i) states that invertible asset payoff functions are weakly better. For example,
an asset that pays off linearly with sales would work better, such as A1(o(θ, i)) =
o(θ, i). Linear assets have in fact been used in Ford motor company sales fore-
casts (see Cowgill and Zitzewitz 2015). Or if the asset value should be bounded,
then A2(o(θ, i)) = 1 − 1/ exp(o(θ, i)) is a possibility. Importantly, both of these as-
set value functions are strictly increasing, and as long as the marketing activity i(θ )
is such that o(θ, i(θ )) is strictly increasing, then these assets can fully reveal demand
θ while (9) cannot for any i(θ ).
Intuition might suggest that invertible asset payoff functions A ∈ A should always
be at least as good as noninvertible asset payoff functions A′ ∈ A′, since the asset
value given optimal policy based on trader information s should be invertible (Propo-
sition 3) for a fully revealing equilibrium to exist. However, this intuition is not cor-
rect in general, as can be shown by way of counterexamples if the combined trader
information is s = θ .8
Still, part (ii) shows that strictly increasing or strictly decreasing asset payoff func-
tions A are weakly better than other functions (in the sense that a fully revealing
equilibrium exists) if the distribution of outcome o(θ, i(s)) conditional on s has a
first-order stochastic dominance ranking, that is, if o(θ, i(s))|s first-order stochas-
tic dominates o(θ, i(s′))|s′ or vice versa for any s = s′ ∈ S. In this case, any strictly
monotone asset payoff function A preserves the ordering of conditional means de-
pending on s ∈ S. This result is more general than the previous one when it comes to
trader information structures, because it holds true even when the combined trader in-
formation is not equal to the state, but still induces a first-order stochastic dominance
ordering on outcomes.
Example 7. To illustrate part (ii), let us revisit the Bond et al. (2010) application but
change the information structure. Let the observable outcome be the firm’s balance
sheet total o(θ, i) = θ + T (θ ) · i where θ are the financial conditions of the firm, i ∈
{0, 1} is a costly but value-increasing intervention, and T (θ ) = βθ is a linear function
representing the effect of the intervention depending on the state of the firm. Bond
8. Consider this simple artificial example. Suppose θ is continuously distributed so that s ∈ (0, 1) and
o(θ, i(s))|s ∼ N (0, s). With the invertible asset payoff function A(x) = x, the conditional expected asset
value is Eθ [A(o(θ, i(s)))|s] = Eθ [o(θ, i(s))|s] = 0∀s ∈ S. But with the noninvertible function A′(x) = x2,
the conditional expected asset value isEθ [A′(o(θ, i(s)))|s] = Eθ [o(θ, i(s))2|s] = s (sinceE[x2] = Var(x) +
E[x]2 = Var(x)), which fully reveals the trader information s.
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et al. (2010) assume 0 > T ′(θ ) > −1 (positive effect of intervention weakens as θ
increases), hence 0 > β > −1.
Suppose traders collectively possess the information s = θ + ε with ε ∼ N (0, σ 2ε )
and σ 2ε > 0, so that the combined trader information is a noisy signal of conditions
θ . The common prior distribution is θ ∼ N (μ, σ 2) with σ 2 > 0.
Suppose further that the decision maker, who does not have information about
θ , wishes to maximize firm value subject to the private intervention cost, u(θ, i) =
θ + (T (θ ) −C)i, withC > 0. If trader information swas revealed, the optimal policy
i(s) would be to intervene whenever
E[θ + (T (θ ) −C)|s] ≥ E[θ |s] ⇐⇒ E[θ |s]β ≥ C
⇐⇒ μ/σ
2 + s/σ 2ε
1/σ 2 + 1/σ 2ε
β ≥ C ⇐⇒ s ≤ σ
2
εC(1/σ
2 + 1/σ 2ε )
β
− μσ 2ε /σ 2 =: ŝ,
(10)
where the last inequality changes because β < 0. The outcome o(θ, i(s))|s is normally
distributed and trader information s shifts the mean. Consequently, the firm stock
value A(o(θ, i)) = o(θ, i) if the trader information s were known is
v(s) =
{
E[θ |s] if s > ŝ,
E[θ |s](1 + β ) if s ≤ ŝ, (11)
with the explicit expression for E[θ |s] in (10). If the parameters μ, σ 2, σ 2ε are such
that E[θ |ŝ] < 0, then v(s) is not invertible, so there is no full revelation in equilib-
rium. Graphically v(s) looks similar to v(θ ) in Figure 2(b). If, on the other hand,
E[θ |ŝ] ≥ 0, then o(θ, i(s))|s has a first-order stochastic dominance ordering: larger
realizations of s increase the mean of the posterior distribution over the firm balance.
Part (ii) then implies that all strictly monotone asset payoff functions, for example,
assets which pay strictly more as the firm’s balance total increases, have a fully re-
vealing equilibrium.
If θ and s have discrete distributions, then part (iii) of Proposition 3 states that an
asset payoff function A(.) that yields a fully revealing equilibrium always exists if
and only the conditional probability mass functions f (o(θ, i(s))|s) are distinct for all
s ∈ S. Informally, the result says that if different trader information induces different
distributions over observable outcomes (assuming the trader information was known
to the policymaker), then an asset payoff function with fully revealing equilibrium is
guaranteed to exist, otherwise no such asset exists.
If the outcomes given optimal policy i(s) do not have different distributions for
different s, then the conditional expected values of the outcomes cannot differ, and
neither can any expected asset value that conditions on these outcomes. For example,
if outcomes can take values {1, 2}, and Pr(o(θ, i(s)) = 1|s = sk ) = Pr(o(θ, i(s)) =
1|s = sl ) for sk = sl , then any transformation A that maps from outcomes into asset
values will yield the same expected asset valuewhether s = sk or s = sl , since both the
outcome values and the probability weights are the same. Thus, the v(s) invertibility
24 : MONEY, CREDIT AND BANKING
condition from Proposition 3 cannot be fulfilled by any asset value function. The
Bernanke and Woodford (1997) setting with s = θ (see Section 2.3) also violates
this condition, since the outcome (inflation) given s is constant across s, because the
inflation targeting CB would always hit the inflation target, so that the probability
mass function of outcomes is the same for every s. Hence, no asset that pays off
depending on the inflation rate could possibly reveal s.
If instead Pr(o(θ, i(s)) = 1|s = sk ) > Pr(o(θ, i(s)) = 1|s = sl ), then A(x) = x
works as asset payoff function, since then
Eθ [A(o(θ, i(sl )))] = Eθ [o(θ, i(sl ))] > Eθ [A(o(θ, i(sk )))] = Eθ [o(θ, i(sk ))] (12)
so that a price function equal to the expected asset values is fully revealing. Hence,
part (iii) is an existence result: if we can find a contractible outcome o(θ, i) which
does not suffer from a self-defeating prophecy problem, then we can always find an
asset which pays off depending on the outcome and has a fully revealing equilibrium.
3. CONCLUSION
This paper develops a general model that captures many situations where a pol-
icymaker maker tries to infer information from financial market prices in order to
improve real decisions, and these decisions might affect asset values. The main result
establishes a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a fully revealing
and accurate (nonbiased) price function, which is also necessary and sufficient for
the existence of a fully revealing REE where the policymaker obtains all trader infor-
mation. Thus, the main result identifies all situations where forward looking traders
reveal their information via trading and policymakers can use this information, and
all situations where information revelation is not incentive-compatible. Moreover, if
a fully revealing equilibrium exists, then it is Pareto-optimal, so this setting is one
where “informational efficiency” corresponds to Pareto-efficiency, and a functioning
financial market improves outcomes in the real sector.
The model unifies several applications from the literature and identifies the com-
mon cause of noninformative prices: self-defeating prophecies. In this analogy, risk-
neutral traders in a competitive market try to forecast the future asset value and buy
the asset up to this price. If the necessary and sufficient condition is not fulfilled, then
the economic environment is such that it is impossible to correctly forecast the asset
value, since these forecasts (prices) trigger policy reactions that affect asset values
and falsify the forecasts.
This problem arises because asset values are endogenous to the policy reaction,
which does not occur in standard financial market models where asset values are
exogenous. The problem of self-defeating prophecies shows that financial markets
may not be informationally efficient even if all traders are perfectly rational, perfectly
informed, and markets are perfectly competitive and without noise.
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The paper demonstrates how the results are useful for the design of assets that
promote information revelation. In particular, it shows how “deadline assets” in cor-
porate prediction markets suffer from the self-defeating prophecy problem and how
a different design of assets fixes the problem. The analysis also shows that market
information can be useful for banking regulation, but at the same time market-based
interventions can never perfectly stabilize the banking sector.
APPENDIX A: PROOFS
Proof of Lemma 1. Necessity. To show: Accuracy implies p(s) = v(s). First, abus-
ing notation, E[a(θ, i(p))|p(s) = p, s j] = E[a(θ, i(s))|p(s) = p, s j] since prices are
fully revealing by assumption. Second,
E[a(θ, i(s))|p(s) = p, s j] = E[E[a(θ, i(s))|s]|p(s) = p, s j] = E[v(s)|p(s)
= p, s j]
(A1)
by the law of iterated expectations. Next, plugging this term into the definition of
accurate prices, p(s) = E[v(s)|p(s) = p, s j] for all j, and taking the conditional ex-
pectation on both sides, E[p(s)|s] = E[E[v(s)|p(s) = p, s j]|s]. Again using iterated
expectations yields p(s) = v(s).
Sufficiency. To show: p(s) = v(s) implies accurate prices. This immediately fol-
lows:
E[a(θ, i(p))|p(s) = p, s j] = E[a(θ, i(p))|v(s) = p, s j] = v(s) = p(s) f orall j. (14)

Proof of Theorem 1. Necessity. To show: Full revelation and accurate prices imply
invertibility of v(s). By Lemma 1, full revelation and accurate prices imply p(s) =
v(s). Since full revelation implies invertibility of p(s), the equality implies that v(s)
is invertible.
Sufficiency. To show: Invertibility of v(s) implies fully revealing and accurate
prices. By construction: The price function p(s) = v(s) is fully revealing since v(s)
is invertible, and accurate (Lemma 1). 
Proof of Proposition 1. Necessity. To show: Existence of a fully revealing REE
implies invertibility of v(s). If s is revealed, then the policy reaction is i(s) and the
expected asset value is v(s). Since s is also revealed to all traders, which is a sufficient
statistic of all trader information, the net demands of all traders are
x j(p, s j ) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
w/p if p(s) < v(s)
∈ [−1,w/p] if p(s) = v(s)
−1 if p(s) > v(s).
(A2)
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Consequently, since we have an REE, we must also have p(s) = v(s), which is the
only price function that clears the market for all s ∈ S. And since the equilibrium is
fully revealing (i.e., p(s) is invertible), v(s) must be invertible.
Sufficiency. To show: Invertibility of v(s) implies existence of a fully revealing
REE. By construction: Set p(s) = v(s), which fully reveals s, leads to policy reaction
i(s) with expected asset value v(s) and therefore clears the market. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Sufficiency. If there exists such a partition P , then p(θ ) =
Eθ [a(θ, i(I ))|θ ∈ I] is a partially revealing equilibrium which reveals that θ ∈ I.
Traders clear the market for this price function, since prices equal expected asset
values from the perspective of traders for every θ ∈  (guaranteed by conditions
2 and 3). Moreover, since there exists |I| > 1 (condition 1), this price function is
partially revealing.
Necessity. If condition 1 fails, then by definition the price function is fully and
not partially revealing. If condition 2 fails, then there exists no partially revealing
price function which induces a policy reaction i(I ) such that traders clear the market
for that price function, because partial revelation requires invertibility in I whereas
market clearing requires noninvertibility. If condition 3 fails, then there exists no par-
tition with part I ∈ P with more than one element such that a(θ, i(I )) = a(θ ′, i(I ))
for θ = θ ′ ∈ I. Hence, in any partially revealing price function the expected asset
value differs by state within some part I whereas the price remains constant, hence
traders do not clear the market. 
Proof of Proposition 3.
(i) We consider the case s = θ . Define v(s = θ,A) := Eθ [A(o(θ, i(θ )))|θ ] =
A(o(θ, i(θ ))). Thus, since s = θ removes all uncertainty in the realization of
θ , we can drop the expectations. First, given some pair θ = θ ′, we will show
that if v(θ,A′) = v(θ ′,A′), then we must also have v(θ,A) = v(θ ′,A) for any
A ∈ A. Formally,
v(θ,A′) = v(θ ′,A′) ⇒ v(θ,A) = v(θ ′,A)∀A ∈ A. (A3)
To show (16) holds, note that for any function A′ ∈ A′,
A′(o(θ, i(θ ))) = A′(o(θ ′, i(θ ′))) ⇒ o(θ, i(θ )) = o(θ ′, i(θ ′)). (A4)
Moreover, because A is the set of invertible functions,
o(θ, i(θ )) = o(θ ′, i(θ ′)) ⇐⇒ A(o(θ, i(θ ))) = A(o(θ ′, i(θ ′)))∀A ∈ A. (A5)
Combining (17) and (18) results in (16).
Now if (16) holds for all possible θ = θ ′ ∈ —which can only happen if the
noninvertibilities are outside the support of o(θ, i(θ ))—then by Theorem 1, the
asset A′ has a fully revealing and accurate price function. Thus, (17) and (18)
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imply that if (16) holds for all possible θ = θ ′ ∈ , then any invertible asset
function A ∈ A must also have a fully revealing and accurate price function.
We still need to show that A ∈ A can allow for full revelation and accurate
prices but A′ ∈ A′ might not. This is immediately obvious from
A(o(θ, i(θ ))) = A(o(θ ′, i(θ ′))) ⇒ A′(o(θ, i(θ ))) = A′(o(θ ′, i(θ ′))). (A6)
(ii) By first-order stochastic dominance in s, Eθ [o(θ, i(s))|s] > Eθ [o(θ, i(s′))|s′]
or inequality reversed for any s = s′ ∈ S. Clearly, any strictly increasing func-
tion A ∈ A (and similarly any strictly decreasing function A ∈ A) of the out-
comes preserves this inequality:
Eθ [o(θ, i(s))|s] > Eθ [o(θ, i(s′))|s′] ⇒ Eθ [A(o(θ, i(s)))|s] > Eθ [A(o(θ, i(s′)))|s′]. (A7)
Thus, rewritingEθ [A(o(θ, i(s)))|s] = v(s), first-order stochastic dominance of
o(θ, i(s))|s and strictly increasing/decreasing asset payoff functions guaran-
tee an invertible v(s) function, which guarantees fully revealing and accurate
prices (Theorem 1).
Clearly, for any nonmonotone functions A ∈ (A ∪ A), the inequality is not
necessarily preserved and hence these do not guarantee existence of fully re-
vealing and accurate prices. Formally, for A ∈ (A ∪ A),
Eθ [o(θ, i(s))|s] > Eθ [o(θ, i(s′))|s′] ⇒ Eθ [A(o(θ, i(s)))|s] > Eθ [A(o(θ, i(s′)))|s′]. (A8)
(iii) Given that θ ∈ {θ1, . . . , θL} and s ∈ {s1, . . . , sK} have discrete distributions,
o(θ, i(s)) also has a discrete distribution. Denote the number of different values
of o(θ, i(s)) in the support by 1 < M ≤ KL. For the remainder of this proof,
I abbreviate o(θ, i(s)) as o (the generic element) or om (a specific element)
whenever possible.
First, rewrite the probability mass function of the outcomes given s in the form




with αkm = f (om|sk ) and bm = 1 if and only if o= om and bm = 0 otherwise.





with the βn’s to be determined later and bn(o) = 1 if and only if o= on as
before. Since n = 1, . . . ,M, we specify one coefficient for every realization
of o, thus specifying the vector β = (β1, . . . , βM ) is equivalent to specifying
the function A(o) for all possible values of o.
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m=1 βm f (om|sk ), which is the conditional expecta-
tion with βm being the value of A(om).
Now we can express these objects in matrix form. Define the K ×M matrix
X as containing the αkm coefficients. Thus, the matrix product of X and the


























⎥⎦ =: V. (A12)
Recall that αkm = f (om|sk ). By assumption, these probability mass functions
are distinct for all s ∈ S, thus all rows of matrix X are distinct. Hence, math-
ematically, the problem translates into the following question: Under which
conditions can we find a vector β (representing function A(o)), such that
V = Xβ—where X has distinct rows—has distinct elements (so that v(s) is
invertible)?
The answer is that such a β (and thus A(.)) always exists. To see this, take two
rows of X , ri and r j with i = j. The conditional expectations given si and s j
are the same if and only if
riβ = r jβ ⇐⇒ (ri − r j )β = 0, (A13)
that is, if and only if the difference between the rows is orthogonal to β. Since
all rows of X are distinct, (ri − r j ) is not the zero vector, and thus any β ∈
R
M except a negligible set (on a hyperplane of RM) will not be orthogonal
to (ri − r j ) and yield different conditional expectations. And since there are
finitely many pairwise comparisons of ri and r j, the subset of RM from which
we can select β isRM without up toK hyperplanes ofRM , which is a nonempty
set. However, from this, it is also obvious that there exists no β such that V
has distinct elements if, for any i = j, ri = r j. 
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Figure 1: Timeline with traders and policy maker.
